报告问题：Disclosing and Cooling-Off: An Analysis of Insider Trading Rules
报告摘要：We analyze two insider-trading regulations recently introduced by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: advance disclosure and ''cooling-off period.'' The former requires an insider to disclose trading plans at adoption, while the latter mandates a delay period before execution. Disclosure increases price efficiency but has mixed welfare implications. If the insider has large liquidity needs, in contrast to the conventional wisdom from ''sunshine trading,'' disclosure can even reduce the welfare of all investors. A longer cooling-off period increases outside investors' welfare but decreases price efficiency. Its implication for the insider's welfare depends on whether the disclosure policy is already in place.
报告人：邓军（副教授） ，对外经济商业大学
主持人：许韬
时 间：2023年05月19日（星期五）下昼14: 40 – 15: 40
地 点：三教212 + 腾讯聚会 946-814-724
报告人简介：邓军 ，副教授, 博士生导师 ，对外经济商业大学金融学院金融工程系主任。2014年获得阿尔伯塔大学数理金融博士学位, 于2007年、2010年划分获得凯时(北京)和中国人民大学本科和硕士学位。研究领域涉及资产定价、数字钱币等。在《Journal of Financial Markets》、《Finance and Stochastics》、《Stochastic Processes and their Applications》、 《Annals of Operations Research》、以及《国际金融研究》等期刊揭晓论文多篇。主授课程包括应用随机历程、金融工程学、金融数学等。担当多本国际期刊审稿人 ，主持和加入多项国家自科项目和横向课题。
